Most of us remained mesmerized by this either or, but in time I came to realize that there actually had been a third choice: delay the decision until the American (and world) public could be brought to understand the threat as he and those around him had really perceived it.

It has now become clear that, at the time, President Bush knew that the presence of such weaponry was uncertain. Some would say that this clarity extended to knowledge of their not being there, but that claim would depend heavily upon the invasion itself for its hindsight. It could not have been his first lie and I will go out on a twig and claim that he understood the risk of detection; but imagined it to be necessary because, regarding this war, he and almost everyone else had been caught up in the prevailing notion of either or.

What follows are two conditions specific to that situation that cried out to be weighed in before an invasion of Baathist Iraq. In fact their being more broadly understood might even have alleviated the need for an invasion:

1. Over a year and a half ago (see Middle East Revisited: Iraq), I noticed that the outrage centering upon the absence of chemical-agent weaponry had been moot. After all for the wealthy, a filing cabinet of agent sources, recipes, and logistics would be much the same as an arsenal whose fuses were a bit longer.

An adviser at that time to President Bush recently (July of 2008) echoed the same sentiment. That adviser knows whether or not the President was aware of this at the time; I don’t. There would have been nothing to be gained from half-lying our nation into that untimely decision. That Clintonesque half lie could only perpetuate the mother of all distractions (the either-oring of WMDs) and confuse everyone. Terrorists would gain; militias would gain; but not his administration, not our country.

On the other hand this truth would have stilled many opposed to a later decision were it to invade, while weakening Hussein’s position and possibly alleviating the need for any invasion. In any case, were there to be war, at least insurgents and terrorists would not have performed so successfully before world opinion.

2. Two years ago (see Nuclear Assault) I elaborated the various actions by which a nation must be considered to have launched a nuclear attack. These criteria apply as well to any weapon of mass destruction. I paraphrase my original article into the current context.

There had been something missing from the 2003 confrontation with Iraq: a clarification of those less obvious actions constituting a WMD assault. Likely to be misconstrued as saber rattling, in fact such a declaration would bring with its openness a fairness both to those who may be otherwise confused and to those down wind from that confusion. Remember how ongoing mutual clarity had formed the foundation of détente.

For me the following defines a chemical warfare assault:

1. A particular nation:

   1. Acquires or produces a chemical warfare device.

   2. Or, being aware of a third party’s malicious intent, either delivers such a devise to that party or supports its production.

2. And with malice aforethought on the part of its possessor, said device:

   1. Is detonated.

   2. Or fails to only by virtue of a failure in its delivery or design.

An intermediary may at first keep such an assault along with Iraqi culpability unrecognized, but chemical warfare weapons leave a victim-nation far less room to maneuver than do conventional ones. How might international protocol deal with something this unclear when it is often meager before the clear? Ultimately each nation must survive upon its own judgment, but were this assault to have become its internal guideline, all would benefit in that revelation.